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SOLIDARITY: ITS LEVELS OF OPERATION, 
RELATIONSHIP TO JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL CAUSES 
– Wojciech Załuski –
Abstract. The paper provides an analysis of the relationship between the concepts of justice and 
solidarity. The point of departure of the analysis is Ruud ter Meulen’s claim that these concepts are 
different but mutually complementary, i.e. they are two sides of the same coin. In the paper two 
alternative accounts of the relationship are proposed. According to the first one, solidarity can be 
defined in terms of justice, i.e. as a special variety of liberal justice, viz. social liberal justice, which, 
apart from the value of liberty, also stresses the importance of the value of equality. An example of 
such a theory is Rawls’ theory of justice, within which the value of equality is ‘encoded’ in the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity and in the difference principle. According to the second 
account, solidarity is an expression of a special type of social relationships – the so-called ‘thick 
relationships’, which (as opposed to ‘thin relationships’) are non-superficial, positive, their para-
digmatic examples being family and friendship; in other words, the rules of solidarity are rules that 
are built into ‘thick relationships’. On the first account, justice and solidarity are not different, 
while on the second account they are different but mutually exclusive rather than mutually com-
plementary. In the last part of the paper some remarks on the social causes of solidarity are made. 
Keywords: justice, solidarity, Rawls, Margalit, thick relationships, equality. 
1. Introduction
The brilliant article by Ruud ter Meulen, “Solidarity and Justice in Health 
Care. A Critical Analysis of their Relationship,”1 provides an in-depth analysis of 
the concept of solidarity, presenting various ways of its understanding, and de-
fending the general thesis that the concepts of justice and solidarity are different but 
mutually complementary to each other, i.e., they are two sides of the same coin. According 
to ter Meulen, the meanings of justice and solidarity, whose genealogy can be 
traced back to the Hegelian distinction between, respectively, Moralität and 
Sittlichkeit, are as follows: justice refers to abstract rights and duties, solidarity – to 
relations of personal commitment, responsibility and mutual recognition. Now, it 
may be asked whether the relationship between solidarity and justice could, and 
1 Meulen [2015]. 
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perhaps should, be conceptualized in a different way, implying either that the con-
cept of solidarity is in fact a special variety of the concept of justice, or that these 
two concepts are indeed different, as ter Meulen asserts, but mutually exclusive 
rather than complementary to each other. I shall argue for the first of these two 
alternative accounts of solidarity in section 3 of this paper. In section 2, I shall de-
fend a more general claim, viz. that the concept of solidarity operates differently at 
the personal level and at the institutional level, and that ter Meulen’s definition 
may fit into the personal level, but not into the institutional one. In section 4, 
I shall briefly touch upon the problem of the social causes of solidarity (i.e. of the 
social factors favouring the occurrence of solidarity-based relationships), not ana-
lyzed by ter Meulen in his paper. 
2. Solidarity at the personal and at the institutional level 
The problem of the relationship between solidarity and justice can be ana-
lyzed at the personal and at the institutional level. The former level concerns face-
to-face, direct relationships between human beings, for instance between patients 
and doctors, the second level concerns the institutional arrangements, for instance, 
the arrangements in health-care systems. Now, it is patently clear that solidarity as 
defined by ter Meulen (meaning an attitude based on personal commitments, mu-
tual recognition, spontaneous feeling of benevolence, and feeling responsibility for 
the other person) is not only not contradictory to an attitude based on justice (im-
plying respect for the other person’s rights and fulfilling one’s duties) but, one 
may say, it necessarily complements it; “necessarily” – because the relations be-
tween doctors and patients based only on mutual respect of each other’s rights 
and on doing, however diligently, one’s duties, would be highly unsatisfactory, 
not only for patients, but also for doctors (at least for those of them who treat their 
profession not just as an occupation but as a vocation). It is also clear that solidari-
ty as defined by ter Meulen could be plausibly regarded as complementary to jus-
tice, understood not only as operating at the personal level (i.e. as a set of rules 
regulating the conduct of doctors towards patients) but also as a set of rules un-
derlying the acceptance of a determinate healthcare system; here, solidarity would 
complement justice in the sense that it would operate at the personal level, guid-
ing direct relationships between patients and doctors, while justice would operate 
at the institutional level (and, as the case may be, also at the personal level). How-
ever, the thesis about the mutually complementary character of justice and solidarity 
seems to be no longer convincing if one assumes that solidarity should operate not only at 
the personal level but also at the institutional one; the reason is that, in this case, it is 
simply unclear what exactly solidarity, understood as personal commitment and 
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mutual recognition, should mean, i.e., what specific institutional arrangements are 
implied by this concept as different from and complementing the ones implied by 
the concept of justice. It appears that the above definition of solidarity is of small 
avail in this context: it is too general and vague to provide a basis for justifying 
particular institutional solutions (though, I would urge, it is sufficiently specific 
and clear to be a guide for behavior in interpersonal relationships). In fact, it is not 
entirely clear to me whether ter Meulen does intend the concept of solidarity to 
operate also at the institutional level. 
3. Solidarity and justice: their relationship at the institutional level 
As mentioned in the previous section, solidarity as defined by Ruud ter 
Meulen would provide rather vague guidance for constructing an institutional 
arrangement, e.g., a healthcare system. What alternative definitions of solidarity 
could be provided? I shall propose two definitions: according to the first one, 
solidarity is a certain variety of the concept of justice; according to the second 
one, solidarity is basically different from justice and thereby cannot be reconciled 
with it. 
Definition 1: Solidarity as a special variety of liberal justice 
Ter Meulen draws a sharp boundary between the concept of liberal justice 
and the concept of solidarity, arguing that the former is connected with the picture 
of an atomistic society of individuals pursuing their self-interest and remaining in 
abstract relationships with each other, whereas the latter is based on close rela-
tionships between human beings, who feel that they have much in common. Let 
me put aside, for a while, the question of whether, on this account of justice and 
solidarity, it can be plausibly maintained that these concepts are mutually com-
plementary; I shall focus first on this account itself. In my view, this account of 
liberal justice is apt only with regard to those conceptions of liberal justice that are 
indifferent to the value of equality (i.e., to the problem of the existing social and 
economic inequalities). Arguably, Rawls’ conception of justice does not belong to 
this type of conceptions: even though it implies the lexical priority of freedom over 
equality, it does not discount equality but assigns much importance to it in the 
form of the two (egalitarian) principles: the principle of the fair equality of oppor-
tunity and the principle of difference. These two principles can be plausibly re-
garded as transforming a classically liberal theory of justice into a socially liberal 
conception of justice. Now, it may be claimed that the latter type of liberal justice is an 
explication of the concept of solidarity. In other words, these two principles may be 
viewed as Rawls’ expression of concern with the value of solidarity. This claim 
becomes even more plausible if one takes into account some other elements of 
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Rawls’ theory, for instance, his emphasis on the morally arbitrary character of 
those differences between human beings that are beyond their control, especially 
those that result from their genetic makeup and from the social circumstances of 
their upbringing (Rawls’ principles of justice were interpreted by Rawls himself as 
aimed at counteracting the consequences of these morally arbitrary differences). 
To criticize my claim, one could argue that Rawls’ conception is still formulated in 
the language of rights and duties and as such it cannot be viewed as an explication 
of solidarity. But this argument does not seem sound: it relies on a rather dubious 
assumption that the concept of solidarity cannot be explicated in such a language. 
The assumption is dubious because, as it seems, what really decides whether a 
given theory is an explication of the concept of solidarity is not whether it is for-
mulated in the language of rights and duties, but what rights and duties it postu-
lates: what therefore matters for considering a given conception a conception of 
solidarity is the content of rights and duties it implies, not whether it is formulated 
in the language of rights or not. The basic advantage of such an explication, as 
compared with the explication in terms of personal commitments and mutual 
recognition, is that it is not vague and provides precise (or at least as precise as 
a philosophical moral theory can provide) directives for constructing institutional 
arrangements. On this explication, it would not be apt to say that solidarity and 
justice are two sides of the same coin; rather, one would have to say (awkwardly) 
that solidarity is one of the possible faces of the justice-side of the coin (leaving 
open the question what is the other side of this coin). 
Definition 2: Solidarity as an expression of a special type of social relationships – the so-
called ‘thick relationships’ 
I have mentioned above the oft-made claim (repeated also by Ruud ter 
Meulen) that liberal justice is typical for an atomistic society, in which relation-
ships between individuals are abstract, i.e., based mainly on negative duties 
(duties to abstain from harming others), whereas solidarity is typical for 
a non-atomistic society, in which relationships between individuals are close, i.e., 
based mainly on positive duties (duties of care, beneficence) and the feeling of 
responsibility for the other person. In the preceding paragraph, I argued against 
the claim that liberal justice necessarily implies this ‘atomistic’ model of society, in 
which individuals are basically indifferent to each other; however, it seems to me 
that the distinction between these two models of society can be used to explicate 
the concept of solidarity (the explication is, of course, different from Definition 1). 
The explication would be as follows: solidarity is a set of rules which can be de-
rived from thick relationships characteristic for a non-atomistic society. I borrow the 
term ‘thick relationships’ from Avishai Margalit, who (in his book The Ethics of 
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Memory2) opposed them to ‘thin relationships’; the former are ‘thick’ because they 
are non-superficial, positive, and thereby imply a more extensive set of duties 
(paradigm examples of such relationships are friendship and family), while the 
latter are ‘thin’ because they are superficial or even non-existent (if they are to-
ward complete strangers), and thereby imply a narrow set of duties, mainly nega-
tive ones. Now, one could argue that the postulate of solidarity is precisely a pos-
tulate to transform, throughout the whole society, ‘thin’ relationships into ‘thicker’ 
ones, and thereby to arouse in the members of this society the feelings of broad 
responsibilities to those whom, prior to such ‘transformation’, they regarded as 
strangers. But this definition of solidarity encounters two difficulties. The first, 
fundamental and disqualifying, is that solidarity thus defined would be an entire-
ly utopian proposal for the modern society; the ideal of extending familial or 
friendship relationships onto the whole society (of transforming a society into 
a kind of family) is entirely utopian, if only on account of the problems of ‘scale’ – 
in large societies this ideal is, for psychological reasons, unfeasible (it is hard to 
maintain ‘thick’ relationships with people whom we hardly know or whom we do 
not know at all). The second problem is that on this definition of solidarity it is not 
clear what particular institutional arrangements solidarity implies; one could only 
say that health-care services in such a society would be very expanded and gener-
ous towards all members of the society. It is worth noting that were we to assume 
that liberal justice is characteristic for an atomistic society (for ‘thin’ relationships) 
and solidarity – for a non-atomistic society (for ‘thick’ relationships), then, by defi-
nition, justice and solidarity would be mutually exclusive rather than mutually 
complementary – they would be different coins and not two sides of the same 
coin. 
4. The social causes of solidarity 
In the final section of this paper I would like to devote a few words to the 
problem of social factors favouring the emergence of solidarity in a society. Let me 
recall that solidarity was defined by Ruud ter Meulen as referring to personal 
commitments, mutual recognition, the feeling of responsibility for other persons, 
spontaneous feelings of benevolence, and that it was not quite clear whether this 
definition was intended to operate at the personal level only or also constitute di-
rectives for setting up institutional arrangements. In the preceding section I pro-
vided two alternative definitions of solidarity: the first one (solidarity as a special 
variety of liberal justice) was intended to operate at the institutional level, and the 
                                                 
2 Margalit [2002]. 
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second one (solidarity as an expression of thick relationships) could, as it seems, 
operate both at the personal and at the institutional level. Now, the interesting 
point is that, regardless of which of these definitions is endorsed, and which level 
of their operation (in the case of ter Meulen’s definition and the definition in terms 
of ‘thick’ relationships) is analyzed, one may plausibly argue that there is a com-
mon social cause that favours solidarity in any of these three senses: the cause in 
question is the decreasing of social and economic inequalities. For it seems that precisely 
social and economic inequalities are the main cause of the lack of solidarity in 
a society. In the case of the definition of solidarity as a special variety of liberal 
justice (Definition 1, section 3) the connection is not so much empirical as estab-
lished conceptually, since solidarity was in fact defined as social justice, i.e., as the 
lack of deep social and economic inequalities; in the case of the two remaining def-
initions (Definition 2, section 3 and ter Meulen’s definition) the connection is em-
pirical. As regards ter Meulen’s definition, one may argue that people can really 
feel personally committed to, responsible for, and capable of truly recognizing on-
ly those people who are their social and economic equals; there seems to be quite 
a real danger that, in the absence of approximate social and economic equalities, 
the above feelings will be just a mask for condescending pity. As regards the defi-
nition of solidarity in terms of ‘thick’ relationships, the argument is that such rela-
tionships can be genuine only with equals, since only with regard to equals can we 
be truly sympathetic and trustful. This last point was made by many thinkers, 
from Aristotle, through Rousseau and Tocqueville, and, recently, by the sociolo-
gists Richard G. Wilkinson and Kate Pickett who argued forcefully in their book 
The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better3 that social and 
economic inequalities are the major cause of various problems in contemporary 
societies, including the problems of physical and mental health. Now, assuming 
that the hypothesis about the existence of a strong causal or conceptual connection 
between social and economic equalities and solidarity is true, then, it seems, some 
additional progress in the discussion on these problems could be achieved if they 
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